HON. THOMPSON: Okay.
MR. PRYOR: Your Honor, I would like to
have one housecleaning measure
taken care of.
HON. THOMPSON: Okay.
MR. PRYOR: The last exhibit that the
Chief Justice offered is a House
Appropriations Bill that is now
pending in the United States
Senate, and I just wanted the
record to accurately reflect that
that is a bill -- an
Appropriations Bill that passed
the House. It has not passed the
Senate of the United States. It
has not become law. We do not
object to its admission. We just
wanted the Court to be aware of
its exact status. Do I need to
repeat it?
HON. VOWELL: Do you agree with that?
MR. JONES: Yes, sir. I haven't -- I
can verify that it has passed in
the House, so that's fine with me.
Yes, sir.
One other thing, Your Honor,
I had some more copies of these I
am going to give to the Clerk.
This is an exhibit we have already
entered and that's just -- makes
copies for everybody.
HON. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Jones.
Could we have the witness return
to the stand.
MR. JONES: He was -- He is on his way
back, Your Honor. There he is.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PRYOR:
Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Chief Justice.
A: Good afternoon, Mr. Attorney General.
Q: Mr. Chief Justice, I believe you testified
on direct examination that you did not
remove the monument because to do so would
require you to violate the First Amendment,
your oath of office, and the Ten
Commandments?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While the Glassroth case was pending in the
federal courts after you were sued in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama, you had attorneys represent you
in that court; isn't that right?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you recall that they presented arguments
on your behalf in those courts?
A: Yes.
Q: One of the arguments that they made on your
behalf was that the monument was not a law
respecting an establishment of religion in
violation of the First Amendment; isn't that
right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You made that argument in the District
Courts, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you made it in the Eleventh Circuit,
didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you made that argument in the Supreme
Court of the United States, didn't you?
A: Well, we submitted that on --
Q: Right.
A: Well, we asked for a petition for a writ of
certiorari on other grounds, in other words,
that they had on the part of a "Lemon test,"
but that was an argument we would have
made --
Q: Right.
A: -- in the United States Supreme Court.
Q: Right. You asked the Court -- the Supreme
Court of the United States to hear --
A: Yes.
Q: -- your case and to hear that argument;
isn't that right?
A: Yes.
Q: The District Court disagreed with your
argument; isn't that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with your
argument?
A: Yes.
Q: And the Supreme Court of the United States
decided not to hear your case; isn't that
right?
A: Yes.
Q: You also presented an argument to the
District Court about your oath, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you presented that argument in the
Eleventh Circuit, didn't you?
A: I did.
Q: And in your petition to the Supreme Court of
the United States, you asked them to hear
that argument, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And each of those -- well, let me start
first.
The District Court disagreed with
that argument; isn't that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with that
argument?
A: Yes.
Q: And the Supreme Court of the United States
decided not to hear your case?
A: Yes.
Q: Finally, as to your argument that the
injunction violated the Tenth Amendment, you
presented that argument in the District
Court, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you presented it in the Eleventh
Circuit, didn't you?
A: I did.
Q: And it was one of the points that you made
in your petition to the Supreme Court of the
United States when you asked them to hear
your case, wasn't it?
A: It was a writ of mandamus, yes.
MR. HARRIS: Excuse me, sir?
A: It was a writ of mandamus. I think that it
was a --
Q: And the District Court disagreed with your
argument; isn't that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the
argument; isn't that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to
hear your appeal?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, earlier you also testified, I believe,
that when the mandate was returned to the
District Court, that it was your
understanding that you should pursue the
appellate process and the District Court
should not enter an injunction; isn't that
right?
A: Well, repeat that again, please.
Q: It was your understanding that, when the
mandate came back to the District Court,
that you were to pursue your appellate
process --
A: Yes.
Q: -- and the District Court was not to enter
an injunction of the kind that it entered on
August 5th; isn't that right?
A: Well, the District Court had already entered
an injunction, but they had stayed the
injunction and there was a stay in effect
when the mandate came down.
Q: But you didn't think that the District Court
should enter the injunction that it did on
August 5th?
A: Not lift the stay. Right. I did not think
that they should have lifted the stay to
impose the injunction after the mandate came
down.
Q: Okay. You asked, though -- After the August
5th injunction was entered by the District
Court, you asked the District Court to stay
that injunction, didn't you?
A: After the August 5th --
Q: Yes.
A: -- came down?
Q: Yes.
A: No. No. The District Court asked us if we
had an objection, and we registered an
objection. I believe that's what you are
talking about. Maybe I am confused. But
after the mandate came down, the District
Court on --
MR. PRYOR: May I approach the witness,
Your Honor?
HON. THOMPSON: Sure.
Q: I'd like to show you, Mr. Chief Justice,
what has already been admitted into evidence
as JIC Exhibit Number Ten, an order of the
United States District Court in the Middle
District of Alabama dated the 18th of August
2003.
A: Right.
Q: And do you -- If you would like, take a
moment to look at it. Does that appear to
be an order denying a request by you to stay
the injunction of August 5th?
A: Okay. Okay. Sure. This is -- This is the
motion to stay. Okay. I've got my times
crossed out. I thought you were talking
about after the mandate and about the
conference that the Court had. This is a
motion to stay.
Q: Right.
A: Correct.
Q: And the District Court denied your motion to
stay the August 5th injunction?
A: Yes, they did. They did. And then it went
to the Eleventh Circuit. They denied it,
and then the United States Supreme Court
refused to stay the mandate.
Q: Well, they actually denied an application
for a stay --
A: On the mandamus.
Q: -- of the injunction --
A: Yes.
Q: -- on August 20th?
A: Yes. August 20th is the very day that he
had originally set.
Q: The deadline --
A: I understand what you are talking about.
Q: That's right. The deadline was set by the
August 5th injunction?
A: Sure. I was speaking earlier about the
August 4th conference call.
Q: Sure.
A: And I thought that's what you were talking
about.
Q: Okay. Mr. Chief Justice, you stand by your
testimony of August 22nd of this year before
the Judicial Inquiry Commission that you
would do it again, don't you?
A: I would do everything that I have done
again. Yes. I mean, what I have done is --
applies to the law. If that's -- I see what
you are talking about when I said -- would I
do it again.
Q: Well, as you know, we have admitted into
evidence the transcript of your testimony.
I just -- I have the shorthand reference. I
just wanted to know whether you stand by
that testimony of that day?
A: I stand by that testimony of that day, and I
have not reviewed it but --
Q: Well, if you would like to review it, you
can.
A: If I may.
Q: Sure.
A: So that we can know -- here it is. Is this
the whole thing?
MR. JONES: That's -- That's the
paragraph -- excuse me. That's
the paragraph where the phrase he
has just referred to came from.
A: Okay. This --
Q: There's the entire transcript, Mr. Chief
Justice.
A: Well, if it's possible for me to read
this --
Q: Sure.
A: May I read the whole thing?
Q: Certainly.
A: Because I think -- I think it's important to
know when I said I would do it again.
"Chief Justice Moore, we welcome you here.
We know that these have been busy times for
you. We appreciate your presence here
today."
Q: You want to read the entire transcript?
A: Well, I think --
Q: I don't mind you reading it, Mr. Chief
Justice, but I would ask that you just read
it to yourself to speed things along.
HON. THOMPSON: The transcript has
already been stipulated to. It's
already into evidence.
A: You know, I didn't want to read the whole
transcript. I wanted to read what I said,
and this is the whole transcript of what
Mr. Jauregui said. So --
Q: Okay.
A: If I may read this paragraph.
HON. THOMPSON: Please.
A: I am upholding my oath. I have nothing to
apologize for. I'm upholding the First
Amendment. I am upholding the Constitution
of Alabama, and we were too ashamed to
acknowledge God. When we let a federal
judge come in and tell us -- call it the
"rule of law," that we can't acknowledge God
as the Justice System says we must, as the
Constitution says we must, then we have got
a problem. I did what I did all the way
through, not from what you read in the
papers, not from what you imagine about
politics or religion or forcing my beliefs
on somebody else. I did what I did because
I upheld my oath, and that's what I did.
So, I have no apologies for it. I would do
it again. I didn't say I would defy the
court order. I said I wouldn't move the
monument, and I didn't move the monument,
which you can take that as you will. But,
you know, I think you have to have respect
for the Court, but I also have respect
enough for the Court to tell them when they
have no jurisdiction in this matter under
the Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which declares that "The
powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." In other
words, the establishment of the Justice
System doesn't belong with the federal
government in Alabama.
One more: But in any event, I
respect you guys and ladies -- and that's my
statement. If you have no question -- if
you have a question, I will be glad to
answer it. And that was it.
Q: And you stand by that testimony --
A: Yes, sir.
Q: -- Mr. Chief Justice? And -- And your
understanding is that the Federal Court
ordered -- ordered that you could not
acknowledge God; isn't that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And if you resume your duties as Chief
Justice after this proceeding, you will
continue to acknowledge God as you have
testified that you would today --
A: That's right.
Q: -- no matter what any other official says?
A: Absolutely. Without -- let me clarify that.
Without an acknowledgment of God, I cannot
do my duties. I must acknowledge God. It
says so in the Constitution of Alabama. It
says so in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. It says so in
everything I have read. So --
Q: The only point I am trying to clarify,
Mr. Chief Justice, is not why, but only
that, in fact, if you do resume your duties
as Chief Justice, you will continue to do
that without regard to what any other
official says; isn't that right?
A: Well, I'll do the same thing this Court did
with starting of prayer; that's an
acknowledgment of God. Now, we did the same
say thing that justices do when they place
their hand on the Bible and say, "So help me
God." It's an acknowledgment of God. The
Alabama Supreme Court opens with, "God save
the State and this Honorable Court." It's
an acknowledgment of God. In my opinions,
which I have written many opinions,
acknowledging God is the source -- a moral
source of our law. I think you must.
Q: You bring up opinions. Sometimes you've
written dissenting opinions, haven't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And sometimes you've been the only member of
the Supreme Court of Alabama to write a
dissenting opinion; isn't that right?
A: Absolutely. Many times. There is only one
dissenting in all the courts. That's a --
and many times one judge will dissent and
others not.
Q: And if you write a dissenting opinion and
the other eight associate justices have
another opinion, when a case returns to the
Circuit Court, which opinion is the Circuit
judge supposed to follow?
A: With the majority.
Q: Thank you.
MR. PRYOR: That's all of my questions.
HON. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Pryor.
MR. PRYOR: Respondent?
MR. JONES: Nothing further. Nothing
further from the Chief Justice.
HON. THOMPSON: Thank you. Chief, you
may step down.
Do any members of the Court
have any questions for this
witness before he is excused?
HON. VOWELL: I have a question.
Mr. Chief Justice, I am afraid
that there's some part of your
testimony that I don't quite
understand. You say that you
don't intend to violate the Court
order; is that correct?
CHIEF JUSTICE MOORE: I don't -- sir,
say it again, please.
HON. VOWELL: Well, let me state it
more clearly. If you return to
your office, would you follow the
injunction, which is a final
injunction issued by the United
States District Court?
CHIEF JUSTICE MOORE: The injunction
was to move the monument. The
monument has been moved. You
can't follow something that's
already been done.
HON. VOWELL: If you return, what, sir,
would you do with the monument?
CHIEF JUSTICE MOORE: Well, I certainly
wouldn't leave it in the closet
out of the view of the public. I
certainly wouldn't -- wouldn't
hide the Word of God when it's an
acknowledgment of God. Exactly
what I would do with it I haven't
decided.
HON. VOWELL: If you ordered --
CHIEF JUSTICE MOORE: It wouldn't stay
in the monument -- I mean, in the
closet, I will assure you that.
HON. VOWELL: Would you put it back in
the rotunda from which it was
removed?
CHIEF JUSTICE MOORE: I wouldn't -- I
haven't decided what I would do
with it.
HON. VOWELL: Well, I think you should
let us know that. It seems to me
a very important issue as to
whether if you would return to
office you would obey the Court
order to remove it.
CHIEF JUSTICE MOORE: Obeyance of the
Court order was to remove it from
where it was. It has been
removed. There would be nothing
to obey. Now, what I would do
with the monument I haven't even
thought about it, quite frankly,
except I would not leave it in a
closet. I have not entered any
ideas in my mind of where I would
put it or what I would do with it.
HON. VOWELL: I see.
CHIEF JUSTICE MOORE: But I would not
leave where it is.
MR. HOWELL: Thank you, sir.
HON. THOMPSON: Any additional
questions from the Court?
(No response).
HON. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief
Justice. Respondent may call its
next witness.
MR. JONES: That's all we have, Your
Honor.
HON. THOMPSON: You rest?
MR. JONES: Yes, we rest.
HON. THOMPSON: Any rebuttal?
MR. GIBBS: No, sir, Your Honor.
HON. THOMPSON: Okay. You may proceed
with closing arguments.
MR. HARRIS: Excuse me one moment.
(Thereupon, a discussion was
held off the record.)
MR. GIBBS: May it please the Court.
In this -- In this case, the facts
of what happened here are clear.
In this case, Chief Justice Roy
Moore participated in lengthy
litigation in the United States
District Court, in the Middle
District of Alabama, in the
Eleventh Circuit and sought review
in the United States Supreme Court
on an issue involving the Ten
Commandments monument in the
rotunda of this building. He
litigated, he raised all the
claims that he has -- that he had
to raise, and he lost. The
exhibits that we've presented in
evidence here showed the judgment
of the District Court at the
various times, the injunction,
careful consideration given to the
arguments raised by the Chief
Justice, the Eleventh Circuit in
consideration they gave to these
arguments, and then the United
States Supreme Court's refusal to
hear the case.
It is clear that when the
case came back to the Middle
District in August of this year
and the injunction was entered
that at that point Chief Justice
began -- that Chief Justice Moore
began to violate the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. You have only to
look at this statement of August
14 of this year. And I am reading
from page four, "As Chief Justice
of the State of Alabama, it is my
duty to administer the justice
system of our state, not to
destroy it. I have no intension
of removing the monument of the
Ten Commandments and the moral
foundation of our law. To do so
would, in effect, result in the
disestablishment of our system of
justice in this state. This I
cannot and will not do." This is
the statement -- the typed
statement that he issued on August
14th. You saw the taped
statement -- the tape of the
statement that he gave in which he
said the same thing.
So, on August 14th of this
year, Chief Justice Moore
publicly, vehemently stated that
he would -- he had no intention
whatsoever of obeying a court
order, a court order entered in a
case where he had been a litigant,
had had the opportunity to raise
each and every claim that he
wanted to raise, where he was --
his case was considered, not just
by one judge in the Middle
District, but by three judges of
the Eleventh Circuit, and then the
United States Supreme Court
decided they did not think the
case was worthy of consideration.
On August 14th, he made a
public statement that he would not
follow the law. Then when the
deadline from the injunction
entered by the Middle District
came and went on August 20th of
this year, the Chief Justice did
not do what he had been ordered to
do in a lawful, valid, unstayed
injunction.
He -- On the twenty-first,
made another statement. And you
saw that statement, the JIC
Exhibit Nineteen, his written
statement -- typed statement of
August the 21st, again, shows his
refusal, that his refusal was
deliberate, that he had no
intention -- had never had any
intention of complying with the
order of the Middle District to
remove the monument. And that
intent is supported by his
actions, or rather his lack of
action, because the day to remove
the monument came and went and it
stayed -- and it remained unmoved.
There was a suggestion in
opening statement about how Chief
Justice Moore was never found in
contempt of court. That was
through no action taken by Chief
Justice Moore. In its order, the
Middle District had talked about
imposing fines in a geometric
progression on the State of
Alabama, and in order to avoid
that, not Chief Justice Moore, but
the other justices on the Alabama
Supreme Court acted to prevent a
contempt finding, but it is clear
that even absent a contempt
finding, Chief Justice Moore never
did anything to come into
compliance with that court order.
His -- The fact that he was not
found in contempt is not relevant
here because by his actions Chief
Justice Moore displayed that he
had no intention of ever complying
with the law as is required by the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. A
judge is required to comply with
the law.
And then in his appearance
before the Alabama Judicial
Inquiry Commission on the
twenty-second he said -- again, he
showed that his -- in his -- that
he was unrepentant. That he did
not and would not and he has not
today acknowledged that he had
done anything wrong, that he had
any duty to follow the law, his
duty to follow the Court order.
In fact, he says -- and he just
read it to the Court -- he would
do it again. He would do it
again. A judge who publicly,
repeatedly states that he is not
obliged to follow a judge's order,
a court order, that has not been
stayed, despite his efforts to
obtain stays from every level of
this judicial system, a judge who
says that is in violation of that
Canon which requires a judge to
comply with the law, at a minimum,
is in violation of that Canon.
There's some suggestion that
he had -- the ability to somehow
rely on the language that -- I
think Mr. Jones elicited about
the -- the Eleventh Circuit
opinions about the -- at the
appropriate time, or there will
become a time when he'll be
required to comply with the law --
when the time comes, that he will
have to comply with the law.
Well, when he went back to the
district judge in August, and on
August 18th, he asked for a stay,
and he didn't get a stay. Then he
went to the Eleventh Circuit and
he asked for a stay, and he didn't
get a stay, and the Eleventh
Circuit refused to recall the
mandate. Then he went to the U.S.
Supreme Court to get a stay, and
they refused to give him a stay.
It was clear by then -- it could
not have been more clear -- that
when -- the time was now to comply
with the law. The time was now
when you can't get a stay and when
you didn't even ask for a timely
stay from the Eleventh Circuit,
after they had initially ruled
against him.
So, when you go back and you
attempt to get a stay from the
District Court, from the Eleventh
Circuit, the very court that --
whose opinion has the language
about while the appellate remedies
continue, when you go back to that
court and they don't give you the
stay, and you go to the U.S.
Supreme Court and they don't give
a stay, at that point it is clear
that the time -- in the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion, when Judge
Carnes talks about the official
will have to follow the law, it is
clear that at that time that's the
time to do it. Now is the time.
You can't -- you have a valid
order, it's not stayed, that's the
time to follow the law. And he
didn't, and he had no intention of
doing it. You can look at his
August 14th statements, and he
didn't do what the judge told him
to do. And it -- Then he goes so
far as, when he appears in front
of the Judicial Inquiry Commission
to say, "I would do it again."
So, those are the facts that
are before this Court. So the
question then becomes -- the
charges in this case -- the six
violations, the first is a
violation of Canon 2A, which
requires that the judge respect
and comply with the law. It's
clear that that -- that Chief
Justice Moore did not respect and
comply with the law in this case.
The second violation that's
alleged is a violation of Canon 1,
which requires that a judge uphold
the integrity and independence of
the judiciary. This, like the
remaining charges of the Canon
violations in this case,
concern -- Chief Justice Moore's
actions do not occur in a vacuum.
Chief Justice Moore's actions in
refusing to comply with the law do
set an example. They do have an
effect on the public. His -- His
defiance, his refusal to follow
the Court order in this case, was
very public. And that public
refusal to follow the Court order
undercuts the entire working of
the judicial system. It undercuts
the ability of the courts to do
business. If the Court's order
is -- is not an obligation, but a
matter of choice -- I appeared in
front of a judge once, and I had
the -- lacked the wisdom to, at
some point, take issue with one of
his rulings after he had ruled,
and he informed me rather quickly
that, you know, Mr. Gibbs, it's a
ruling, not a negotiation.
Now, this is an order, not a
negotiation. A Court issues an
order to a litigant, that litigant
must do as told, unless he can
obtain relief by appeal; and
that's what Chief Justice Moore
tried to do in this case. He was
unsuccessful. But a losing
ligament must obey an order of the
Court. When you have as an
example the Chief Justice of the
judicial system -- the head of the
judicial system who is not obliged
to follow a court order but can
choose, it's optional whether to
obey a Court order or not, then
what message does that send to the
public, to other litigants, to
people who rely on the judicial
system for relief? Well, the
message it sends is, well, if you
don't like the Court order, you
don't have to follow it. Now,
that absolutely undercuts the
integrity and independence of the
judiciary. It absolutely violates
the Canon 1 requirement that a
judge must observe high standards
of conduct so that the integrity
and independence of the judiciary
may be preserved as charged in the
complaint. And the fourth
violation is that the Canon 2
requirement that a judge avoid
impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of his
activities, that Canon 2A
requirement that a judge conduct
himself at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. And the last is
the Canon 2 violation that the
judge avoid conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice,
which brings the judicial office
into disrepute.
I submit to you that all
those Canons -- all those Canons
are violated by Judge -- Chief
Justice Moore's actions in this
case because Chief Justice Moore's
actions in this case undercut the
ability of the judicial system to
do its work by issuing orders and
expecting those orders to be
followed, not -- by the losing
litigant. If that conduct -- if
conduct that says that an order is
an option, it's not an order, it's
not binding, is the rule, then it
would have -- it will have
disastrous effects on the judicial
system as a whole. And it is
that, the failure to comply with
the law as is required by the
Canons, and the devastating effect
of this example from the highest
official -- the highest official
in the judicial system, it is that
example that violates -- that
shows the violation of these other
Canons.
Again, what happened here --
what happened here is clear.
Chief Justice Moore had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the
issues in this case just like many
other litigants, just like many
other litigants. He lost. Maybe
he was right. Maybe he was wrong.
But he had a trial. He had an
opportunity to get it reviewed and
he lost. A losing litigant
doesn't have a choice about
following a court order. That
order is binding. Chief Justice
Moore attempted to get relief from
the order. He was unsuccessful.
In order to comply with the
law, in order to comply with the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, he had
no choice but to follow the order.
And when he chose not to follow
the order, then he violated the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. And
for that, this Court must hold him
accountable and should find that
he has violated the Canons as
charged in the complaint in this
case. Thank you.
HON. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Gibbs.
Respondent.
MR. JONES: May it please the Court,
Chief Justice Moore, Attorney
General Pryor, my fellow counsel.
As I look around, I have to wonder
amongst all these right and
learned attorneys what a lawyer
from the briar patch down in
Luverne is doing here. It's
overwhelming. But I can say this,
I can say this, "God has chosen
this time and this place so that
we can save our country and save
our courts for our children."
Now, I would like to take credit
for that, but I must give credit
to that to the speaker who said
that, and that was Attorney
General Bill Pryor on April the
13th, 1977, at a "Save the Ten
Commandments Rally." But --
HON. THOMPSON: Would you please
refrain from clapping or making
any other gestures. You may
proceed.
MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. I
do agree that this is the time.
Now, you know, it's hard for an
attorney like me to make a closing
without telling a story. So,
there's a story that I think is
very appropriate here. It is a
story of a man who was a tight
rope walker, and he decided he was
going to walk a tight rope between
two tall buildings. And so, of
course, it was publicized that he
was going to do this, and when he
got there, there was a crowd. So,
he climbs up on the building, and
as he gets to the top of the
building the crowd is down there,
and he looks down at the crowd and
he says: Do you believe that I
can walk across this tight rope?
Do you believe I can do it? The
crowd yells: We believe you can
do it. So, he gets on the tight
rope and he walks across to the
other side. When he gets to the
other side, he looks down and he
says: How many of you believe
that I can ride a bicycle across
this tight rope? Of course, the
crowd goes wild and says: We
believe you can do it. So he,
gets on his bicycle and he goes
back across to the other side. He
gets to the other side and he
looks down at the crowd and he
says: How many of you believe
that I can go across this tight
rope in a wheelbarrow? And, of
course, they all say: We believe,
we believe you can do it. And he
says: Okay. Says: Which one of
you want to get into the
wheelbarrow?
Now, I say that because of
this: We are here today on a very
important issue. But let me say
this: As I look and see things
across this state, when we run for
political office, we prominently
display what church we go to, or
how many years we have taught
Sunday School, we prominently
display that on our literature.
When we are elected to office, we
take an oath, even as judges here
on this court took, that says, you
will fulfill your duties, so help
me God. When we take that oath,
we place our hand on a Bible, not
any other document, a Bible. When
our courts begin, just like we did
today, they begin it in prayer.
Not just this court, but the court
that I am honored to serve in
Crenshaw County does it every
time.
When our legislators begin,
they begin their legislative
sessions with a prayer. Every
year -- every year our appellate
courts attend a church service
called the "Red Mass," asking for
the blessing of the -- of God on
the Court.
Our currency promptly states,
"In God we trust." The United
States Supreme Court, when they
begin their sessions, they say,
"God save the United States and
this Honorable Court." Our Pledge
of Allegiance, and I have to -- I
have to admit, you know, I didn't
always know how to say the pledge
of allegiance. When I first
joined the Rotary Club down in
Luverne, when I was a much younger
person, a very nice fellow down
there by the name of Ed Turner
took me aside and explained to me
how you say the Pledge of
Allegiance. He said, look, you
don't ever say it any other way
but "one nation under God." He
said because you don't ever want
to separate God from the nation.
The Luverne Rotary Club still says
the pledge that way today. We
said it that way last Monday.
So, we are here today,
standing on the ground, looking
up, looking up, and the question
is, who is going to get in the
wheelbarrow, and we are here
because somebody finally got in
the wheelbarrow. Chief Justice
Moore finally got in the
wheelbarrow. That is what he has
done.
Now, counsel for the Judicial
Inquiry Commission has
characterized what he has done as
supporting anarchy, a license for
anybody that wants to to go out
and disobey an order. And you've
read the trial brief and what they
have said today, but we have cited
in our trial brief an article by
Mr. Tuomala, and I hope I am
pronouncing that correctly.
That's who I think it is. And he
in there -- and I just want to
refer to it real quickly. He
quotes in there, Brigadier General
Paul K. Van Riper, and it's an
address he made upon assuming
command of the Second Marine
Division. You see just like what
he's -- what we have just heard,
the military, above everybody,
depends on what? Orders. You
can't think of an institution in
our society that is more dependent
on orders than the military. This
is what the Brigadier General
said. He said, "For most of us
these four values [faith, family,
Constitution and Corp] will
normally be in balance, and we
need make no decisions in regard
to their priority. Occasionally,
however, conflicts can arise. If
it does, use the order in which I
have presented them to make a
judgment. For example, if our
Corps asks you to do something
that would violate your oath to
support and defend the
Constitution, don't do it. Or if
the Nation asked you to act in a
manner which violates your faith,
don't do it. Those who live by
faith, remember family and
friends, defend our Nation, and
honor the Corps will be a source
of pride to all who stand in and
behind them on the frontiers of
freedom."
The same -- the same applies
here. The same applies here.
There will not be anarchy. There
won't be this mass refusal to obey
court orders. That won't happen.
In fact, I would suggest that
possibly, possibly there may even
be more respect for the judiciary
because of a man with conviction
and conscience that finally got in
the wheelbarrow.
Now, counsel for the Judicial
Inquiry Commission have basically
said there is no other remedy for
what the Chief Justice has done
other than removal. As I read
their trial brief and have heard
their arguments here today, as I
understand it, they think that is
the only appropriate remedy. They
have cited you a number of cases
in your trial brief, a number of
cases. I've made copies of those
cases, five of them, five of them.
And I would ask you to please read
those cases. Please read those
cases and see what they have cited
to you and the conduct that took
place in those cases, and compare
those, if you would, to the cases
before you today.
Now, they may correct me, and
I am sure they will if I am wrong,
but I have not found a single case
where a judge was disciplined for
disobeying a single court order.
Not one. And they haven't cited
you one. The difference between
this case and those cases is
substantial, substantial. Please
read those cases. There's not any
dishonesty here. There's not any
neglect of duties here, none of
the things that these other judges
had in their cases. There's been
no history of disciplinary
proceedings, nothing like that.
This is a totally different and
separate case.
And if the Court would
indulge me, I know we don't have
the opportunity, as is the
procedure of this court, to come
back after your finding and give
you any evidence in mitigation, or
otherwise, of whatever you may do.
But I do want to point out to you
a couple of cases that have come
directly from this Court. I
believe the last judge that was
removed by the Court of Judiciary
was in 1999. That case involved a
judge who did several things, and
I will just list them for you. He
made incorrect statements to
investigators. He presented a
false, worthless, and misleading
deposit slip to State examiners to
try to cover a $23,000 charge-back
they had made to him. He cashed
eight personal checks from funds
in his own office that turned out
that his checks were returned
because they were insufficient,
and he did not pay those checks
until three years later when the
examiners found it and brought it
to his attention. The judge also
failed to properly maintain his
office. And once that was brought
to his attention, he made
absolutely no effort whatsoever to
correct those deficiencies. Now,
that judge was the last judge that
was removed from office, and even
with those facts, the Court was
not unanimous that that judge be
removed.
I would also point out one
other case to the Court, and that
is the Court of Judiciary Case
Number 26. In that case, a judge
was charged with inappropriately
touching females under the age of
21 under his jurisdiction as a
district judge. He was also
accused of inappropriately
touching females over the age of
21 that were employees in the
courthouse. That was the charges
against him. He was -- he was
found to have violated Canons 1,
2, 2A and 3A. That was the
finding of the Court. His
punishment was suspension without
pay for six months. That was what
his punishment was by the Court.
Your Honors, we believe that
Justice Moore has not violated the
Judicial Canons of Ethics. He has
been suspended -- disqualified
from his office for almost 90 days
now. We would ask Your Honors to
please let him go back to the
position that he was elected to
do.
At this time, I would call on
Justice Butts to finalize our
closing.
MR. BUTTS: Your Honors, Chief Justice
Moore, Attorney General Pryor,
fellow counsel. You know, so many
times in this life we just seem to
be completely lost. Is this one
of those times? After this
verdict when you are alone with
your thoughts, can you answer and
be satisfied with your answer to
such questions as: Did I serve my
God today? Did I do the right
thing today? How will history
view my actions?
You may be sure history will
judge us all. You may be assured
that as President Kennedy once
wrote, "Only the very courageous
will be able to keep alive the
spirit of individualism and
dissent which gave birth to this
nation, nourished it as an infant,
and carried it through its
severest test to the attainment of
its maturity."
Throughout history, there are
many examples of courage, or as
Ernest Hemingway liked to call it
"grace under pressure." You need
look no further than the story of
Senator Edmund Ross of Kansas who
was elected as a radical to the
United States Senate. And when
the impeachment of Andrew Johnson
occurred, after he succeeded
President Lincoln after his
assassination, Edmund Ross was the
one Senator that kept Andrew
Johnson from being removed from
office. Senior Ross was quoted as
saying, but prior to casting his
vote, "I looked down into my open
grave." Yet, Senator Ross has
given a place of honor in standing
alone with his convictions and
with his conscience in doing the
right thing.
So, how do you Judge Roy
Moore? You cannot doubt his
courage. You cannot doubt his
love of God. You cannot doubt his
love of country. You cannot doubt
his love of family. You cannot
doubt his faithfulness to his oath
of office. So, how did we arrive
here at this moment in time? The
Judicial Inquiry Commission
pursued Roy Moore for ten years
until it finally ran into ground
with the charges he faces today.
The Attorney General would have
you believe that this is only a
simple issue, that an order given
by a man, a federal judge to move
a granite monument from public
view. The Attorney General would
say to you that the rule of law
requires you to obey that order.
If you believe the Attorney
General in that argument, then
this case can go no further. You
will then have convicted Roy
Moore. At that point, the only
thing left for you to decide is
his punishment. But if you are
true to yourselves, you will
examine Roy Moore, the man, and
Roy Moore, the public official.
Keep in mind, as you examine Roy
Moore, his actions that lead him
here today are not only the
results of his beliefs but also
directly the results of actions by
Federal Judge Myron Thompson.
Please also bear in mind that
Judge Thompson made the statement
that he, Judge Thompson, cannot
define religion. That, in fact,
it would be dangerous to define
it.
What led us here today is
simple: How can an individual who
cannot define religion hold that
Roy Moore is guilty of the
establishment of religion? If Roy
Moore is then true to his oath,
how can he be guilty of any
ethical violation?
Chief Justice Moore's defense
is quite simple: (1) the order of
Myron Thompson was unlawful,
because it placed Chief Justice
Moore in a position of violating
his oath, or audibly risk being
held in contempt of court; (2)
Chief Justice Moore's oath under
the Constitution requires him to
acknowledge God as the moral
foundation of our law. Adherence
to his oath placed him at odds
with the injunction of Federal
Judge Myron Thompson. Justice
Moore's oath is to the
Constitution, not to any one man.
To the prosecutions' way of
thinking, a federal judge has
issued a lawful order to remove a
display of the Ten Commandments
because it violates the
establishment of religion clause
of the Constitution. By the
prosecutions' thinking, since a
federal judge issued an order,
then it must be a lawful order to
remove the monument display.
The problem with the
prosecutions' thinking and those
that agree with him, is simply
that they have entered into and
share the belief that the opinion
of judges about the meaning of the
Constitution and not the
Constitution itself is the law of
the land. As a result, if you
believe that way, then the
prosecution believes that one's
oath of office is an allegiance to
the judiciary, rather than to the
Constitution.
This subjective
interpretation of oaths by the
prosecution changes the oath from
one of allegiance to the law to an
oath of allegiance to an office
holder, in this case, a federal
judge. Roy Moore took an oath
that, quote, "I will support the
Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State
of Alabama so long as I continue
to be a citizen thereof, and that
I will faithfully and honestly
discharge the duties upon which I
am about to enter, to the best of
my ability, so help me God."
As Professor Jeffrey Tuomala
has so stated, "There's an
essential difference between an
oath promising to support the
Constitution and an oath of
allegiance to a person or
persons." For example, compare
the military oath of enlistment
that a subject of the Queen of
England, where they have the oath
of enlistment, with what the oath
of enlistment that a citizen of
the United States swear upon
military service. A Canadian, for
example, states, "I do swear that
I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty, Queen
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of
Canada, her heirs and successors
according to law, so help me God."
An American, on the other hand,
states, "I do solemnly swear that
I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and
domestic. That I will bear true
faith in allegiance to the same,
and that I will obey the orders of
the President of the United States
and the orders of the officers
appointed over me according to
regulations and the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, so help me
God."
The point is, that a servant
or subject of Canada or England
has no duty of individual
judgment. Their oath is to the
Queen herself, so that in that
instance one can more easily
justify compliance with an
unlawful order of the Queen that
goes contrary to conscience and
law, because the oath is one of
the allegiance to the Queen and
not to the law.
What makes this so striking
and instructive is that the
prosecution has been quoted as
saying that the Ten Commandments
is the cornerstone of American
law. The key to understanding the
prosecution's stance is they
believe that courts make laws and,
by extension, that the official's
oath of office is one of
allegiance to the judiciary and
not to the Constitution itself.
The basis of the six charges
against the Chief Justice is not
that he violated the First or
Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution or of
any law in active pursuant
thereto, but rather that he failed
to comply with an existing and
binding court order directed at
him. All six charges are
basically the same. What is
important to keep in mind is that
the essence of the charge is a
violation of a court order. The
charge is "failure to comply with
the court order." The mistake
that has been made here is simply
that the Judicial Inquiry
Commission has equated a court
order with law. Failure to comply
with an order is illegal, only if
the order is itself illegal -- I'm
sorry. Failure to comply with an
order is illegal only if the order
itself is legal, just as
conviction for violating a law is
valid only if that law is valid.
Every 18-year-old soldier,
sailor, airman and Marine, who has
ever worn a uniform, understands
the difference between a lawful
and an unlawful order. He or she
knows that they may not be
convicted under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice for failure to
obey an unlawful order.
The difference between the
Attorney General and the Chief
Justice does not appear to be in
their understanding of the First
Amendment. It appears to be,
primarily, a difference in their
view of the law-making power of
courts and the meaning of the
oath. Chief Justice Moore's
position is that he has sworn an
oath to uphold and defend the
United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the State of
Alabama. In partially fulfilling
his duty, the Chief Justice placed
a monument memorializing the moral
foundation of American law in the
rotunda of the judicial -- Alabama
Judicial Building. Additionally,
several provisions of the Alabama
Constitution acknowledged the law
of God as the foundation of law in
Alabama. The Constitution begins
with these words in the Preamble,
"In order to establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility and
secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and to our posterity,
invoking the favor of Almighty
God, do ordain and establish the
following Constitution: All men
are equally free and independent.
They are endowed by their creator
with certain inalienable rights,
so help me God."
By Constitutional provision
and statute, the Chief Justice is
the head of the judicial system in
Alabama. It is his duty to make
sure that judicial personnel have
a proper understanding of the law,
and that they administer justice
properly. The Canons of Judicial
Ethics, under which the Chief
Justice is being prosecuted,
placed additional duties on all
judges to properly administer the
law. For example, all judges are
supposed to participate in
establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing high standards of
conduct. Judges are encouraged to
speak, write, lecture, teach and
participate in other activities
concerning the law of the legal
system and the administration of
justice. The purpose of ethical
conduct is not simply to ensure
that justice will be done in
individual cases, but that the
public will be assured of what
they have a right to expect.
In short, the posting of the
Ten Commandments provides the
standards of personal conduct for
judges and court personnel, the
basis for law, and the assurance
to the public of the integrity of
the system and the rule of law.
Thus, the Chief Justice has a duty
to expound the law, as does every
lawyer in the State of Alabama.
The foundation of the civil law is
a -- is that standard of justice
which is summarized in the Ten
Commandments. That foundation is
expressly recognized in the
Alabama Constitution. When a
federal court tells a chief
justice that he may not perform
his duties as required by law, it
is the Federal District Court
judge who is violating the law,
not the Chief Justice.
It's ironic that the very
conditions that Chief Justice
Moore addressed with the
monument -- ignorance and disdain
for the moral foundation of our
laws, oaths and national creed --
are the very conditions that have
led to the charges against him.
How ironic. Chief Justice Moore
is a graduate of the United States
Military Academy at West Point.
He is a veteran of the war in
Vietnam. He understands the
difference between a lawful order
and an unlawful order. He knows
why it was unlawful during the
Vietnam War for Lieutenant Rusty
Calley to shoot unarmed women and
children, even if he was so
ordered by his superiors. He
understands the nature of his oath
of office. It is an oath sworn
before God and man to the
Constitution.
Failure to acknowledge God
actually undermines the very
Canons upon which Chief Justice
Moore is being tried. The Canons
of Judicial Ethics -- please note,
the primary purposes of the Canons
is to protect the public rather
than to discipline an individual
judge. Propriety is often in the
eye of the beholder. A given
individual will find conduct to be
within or beyond the bounds of
propriety to the extent that the
person comports with that
individual's own highly subjective
views of propriety. The
appearance of impropriety
standards should be freely
applied. Indeed, lack of
specificity as to what conduct
makes a judge vulnerable to a
charge of appearance of
impropriety raises serious due
process concerns. To allow
disciplinary proceedings to
evaluate judicial decisions could
force judges into ill-defined and
standardless lines of propriety
and impropriety. Holding such a
sword over a judge's head would
have a tendency to chill his
independence. A judge would have
to be as concerned with what is
proper in the eyes of the
judicial -- disciplinary
commission as with what is the
just decision.
Let me read you one quick
quote from a gentleman that I
admire. Mr. Doug Phillips has
said this more eloquently than I
can say it. "The American legal
establishment has strange
priorities. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the way covenant
keepers and covenant breakers are
treated by the political elites
within the system. When a former
president of the United States
shattered his marriage covenant,
disgraced his office, and broke at
least two of the Ten Commandments
by committing adultery in the Oval
Office, and then bearing false
witness to the people of the
United States, the most trusted
and high ranking legislators in
our nation found him not guilty of
crimes sufficient to remove him
from office. When Chief Justice
Roy Moore defended all ten of the
Ten Commandments, he was charged
with ethical violations."
The prosecution talks about
the Chief Justice being
unrepentant. You can only be
unrepentant to God, not to man.
The Judicial Inquiry
Commission takes the position that
there is no statute of limitations
on unethical conduct for judges.
If you have ever received a
speeding ticket or stopped for DUI
or if you, as a judge, ever
stepped on an attorney's private
airplane for a golf trip to
Augusta or to a Super Bowl game or
made a trip anywhere and then sat
on that attorney's case, you could
be charged with an ethics
complaint as early as tomorrow.
So, remember, as you judge
Roy Moore today, that tomorrow you
may yourself be judged.
Let me explain in concluding
who Senator James W. Grimes of
Iowa is. Senator Grimes was one
of the Senators that voted against
the impeachment of Andrew Johnson.
Right before his death, he wrote
these words, "I shall ever thank
God that in that troubled hour of
trial, when many privately
confessed that they had sacrificed
their judgment and their conscious
at the behest of party newspapers
and party hate, I had the courage
to be true to my oath and to my
conscience. Perhaps I did wrong
not to commit perjury by order of
a party, but I cannot see it that
way. I became a judge acting on
my own responsibility and
accountability only to my own
conscience and my Maker, and no
power could force me to decide on
such a case contrary to my
convictions whether that party was
composed of my friends or my
enemies."
And so to the Court of the
Judiciary, we have done all we
know that we can do to impress
upon you that the Chief Justice,
being true to his oath, has not
committed any ethical violations.
As Mr. Jones pointed out to you,
the judges that have been tried by
this panel, from judges charged
with sexual misconduct to only
receive six months in suspension,
cannot be compared with the Chief
Justice who has done nothing
morally wrong. He has done
nothing legally wrong. He obeyed
his oath. He was true to his God
and to his oath of office. Please
be careful how we judge Roy Moore
today. As we turn Chief Justice
Roy over to this panel's judgment,
remember the words of Harper Lee
in To Kill A Mockingbird, "The one
thing that doesn't abide by
majority rule is a person's
conscience."
For the respect of all
Alabama citizens, for the respect
of this country, for the respect
of God and all His righteous, find
Chief Justice Roy Moore not guilty
and restore him to the people of
Alabama as Chief Justice. Thank
you.
HON. THOMPSON: Please. The Attorney
General.
MR. PRYOR: May it please the Court,
Mr. Chief Justice, learned
co-counsel. This case presents an
all-or-nothing proposition.
Either the Judicial Inquiry
Commission is right and Chief
Justice Moore is guilty and must
be removed, or Chief Justice Moore
is right and must be exonerated.
There is no middle ground.
My learned opposing counsel
has invited you to read the cases
that we have cited to the Court.
He has stated that none of those
cases involved a judge who refused
to obey a single court order. I,
too, invite you to read those
cases. For none of them involve
the highest judicial officer of a
state refusing to comply with a
federal injunction entered by a
Federal District Court, affirmed
by three judges of a U.S. Court of
Appeals, and where the judge had
an opportunity and did ask for
stays from that District Court,
stay from the Eleventh Circuit,
and a stay from the Supreme Court
of the United States, all of which
were denied. None of those cases
involved the highest judicial
officer of a state in that context
then coming before the Commission
and saying, "I would do it again."
The stakes here are high
because this case raises a
fundamental question: What does
it mean to have a government of
laws and not of men? The
resolution of this case will
answer that question for three
groups of Alabamians: First, an
answer must be provided to every
judge in Alabama, because the
judiciary is an independent,
although imperfect, branch of our
government. It is staffed by
hundreds of trained lawyers who
serve the public by administering
justice. When an Alabama judge is
presented with a controversy that
poses a difficult legal problem,
the judge must evaluate the law
and the facts carefully, and then
provide his best judgment subject
to the review of other judges.
A trial judge can be reversed
on appeal, and an appellate judge
or justice can be on the losing
side of a divided panel. In our
system, a judge must respect and
follow the final decisions of
other judges, even when he is
convinced they are wrong. A trial
judge with more years of
experience and perhaps better
judgment than any appellate judge,
for example, must follow an order
reversing the decision of the
trial judge.
The answer this Court must
provide to every judge in Alabama
is that no judge is above the law.
Second, an answer must be provided
to every public official in
Alabama. When we think of the
rule of law, one group of public
officials immediately comes to
mind: Police officers. Thousands
of police officers each day
enforce the law in the communities
of our state. Each officer takes
an oath to uphold the
Constitution. Consider a police
officer who concludes after
careful study of that
Constitution, and the history of
the Constitution which he is sworn
to uphold, that the Supreme Court
of the United States was wrong in
its decision of Miranda versus
Arizona. The police officer finds
himself in agreement with many
judges, law professors and
prosecutors, that the Fifth
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution were not
intended to require a police
officer to warn a person under
arrest that he has a right to
remain silent, and he has a right
to an attorney. Should that
police officer follow his own view
of the Constitution? Or should
the officer respect the decision
of the Supreme Court and warn an
arrestee that he has a right to
remain silent? Should the police
officer follow his own view of the
Constitution in the hope that the
unwarned arrestee will confess to
the crime? Should the officer
risk that the courts will throw
out the confession and allow a
murderer or a rapist to go free
because the police officer
followed his own view of the
Constitution and failed to warn
the arrestee? The answer this
Court must provide to every public
official, including every police
officer is that no official is
above the law.
Finally, this Court must
provide an answer to every citizen
who depends on the rule of law to
protect our freedom. Each year,
the Courts of Alabama hear and
decide disputes between thousands
of citizens. Fathers and mothers
allow Courts to decide the custody
of their children. Both the
wealthiest chief executive officer
and the shareholders of a
corporation allow the Courts to
determine whether the CEO cheated
the shareholders. A permanently
disfigured and disabled worker and
the most powerful corporation
allow the Courts to decide whether
the company owes the worker any
compensation for his injuries.
Everyone of these citizens
and thousands more who come before
the Courts, must know that the
final orders of the Courts will
decide their disputes, even if
that citizen disagrees with that
order. Someone has to lose. And
virtually always the losing
litigant thinks he was right and
the Court was wrong.
This Court must provide the
answer that no citizen, whether
rich or poor, powerful or weak, is
above the law. As I mentioned a
moment ago, the judicial branch of
our government, both our federal
government and our state
government, as human institutions
are imperfect, they sometimes make
mistakes, even terrible ones. We
correct some of those mistakes on
appeal. Sometimes the Appeals
Court, even the Supreme Court,
gets it wrong, too. Fortunately,
our Constitution gives us
remedies.
I stand by my remarks from
1997, that we are called by God to
do what is right. But we are
called to exercise our
Constitutional rights in
fulfilling His will. We can elect
law makers, legislators to change
the law. We can elect presidents
to appoint judges faithful to the
law. We, the people, can even
amend the Constitution itself.
That is what our nation did when
it abolished slavery, with the
Thirteenth Amendment which
overruled the abominable decision
of the Supreme Court in Dred Scott
versus Sanford. But the refusal
of a party to comply with a Court
order, whether the Court order is
right or wrong, is not a remedy
provided by the Constitution.
Because Chief Justice Roy
Moore, despite his special
responsibility as the highest
judicial officer of our state,
placed himself above the law by
refusing to abide by a final
injunction entered against him and
by urging the public through the
news media to support him, and
because he is totally unrepentant,
this Court regrettably must remove
Roy Moore from the office of Chief
Justice of Alabama. The rule of
law upon which our freedom
depends, whether a judge, a police
officer or a citizen, demands no
less. Thank you.
HON. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Attorney
General. I would like to thank
counsel for their handling of this
matter. Everyone has performed
quite admirably. I want to thank
all the people here in the rotunda
for being a participant in the
judicial process.
The evidence having been
heard in this matter, this Court
will recess at this time.
Mr. Jones, would you like to be
heard?
MR. JONES: I just want to be sure I
hand you those cases, Your Honor,
before you leave.
HON. THOMPSON: Okay. I'll make sure
that happens. We will recess at
this time. And we will also
attempt to do our best to give you
sufficient notice when this
Court's ruling has been made and
to allow you sufficient time to
return to this rotunda -- to this
courtroom.
At this time, unless there is
anything further from the members
of this Court, this Court stands
in recess, and we will be
releasing our decision on this
case as efficiently and as
expediently as possible. Thank
you.
(At which time, a recess was
taken at 2:45 p.m. and the
hearing will be reconvened.)
(At which time, the hearing
before the Alabama Court of
Judiciary was continued at
11:17 a.m. on Thursday
November 13, 2003.)
HON. THOMPSON: Good morning. As Chief
Judge of the Alabama Court of the
Judiciary, it is my duty to report
to you the decision of the Court.
The complete, final judgment of
this Court will be received --
released following the synopsis of
this judgment.
As a reminder, please
remember -- please remember that
no judge on this Court may comment
on this case.
The Court of the Judiciary is
a constitutionally created Court,
the soul function of which is to
convene, to hear allegations of
judicial misconduct. The case
currently before the Court was
commenced by the filing of a
complaint by the Judicial Inquiry
Commission alleging that Roy S.
Moore, as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Alabama,
willfully failed to comply with an
injunction issued to him by the
United States District Court for
the Middle District of Alabama,
thereby, violating Canons 1, 2, 2A
and 2B of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
Specifically the complaint
alleges that Chief Justice Moore
failed to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary and
failed to observe high standards
of conduct so that the integrity
and independence of the judiciary
might be preserved as required by
Canon 1; that Chief Justice Moore
failed to avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in
all his activities as required by
Canon 2; that Chief Justice Moore
failed to respect and comply with
the law and to conduct himself at
all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary as required by Canon 2;
and that he failed to avoid
conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice which
brings the judicial office into
disrepute.
These are the issues which
are properly before this Court.
This Court has neither the
authority nor the jurisdiction to
decide the correctness of the
decisions of the United States
District Court or the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. All of the
members of this Court, after
serious consideration of the
evidence and testimony presented
at this trial, find by clear and
convincing evidence that Roy S.
Moore while in his role of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of
Alabama did willfully and publicly
defy the federal court order
directed to him.
In the American system of
justice, the courts are open to
all of the citizens of this
country. A dissatisfied litigant
has the opportunity to appeal an
unfavorable ruling. When that
person's legal remedies have been
exhausted and the rule of law
dictates that that person follow
the order of the Court, in this
case the Chief Justice exhausted
all of his legal remedies and was
unsuccessful in his attempts to
stay the injunction issued by the
Federal District Court. In
defying that Court's order, the
Chief Justice placed himself above
the law.
To quote the Supreme Court of
the United States, "No man in this
country is so high that he is
above the law. All the officers
of the government from the highest
to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it."
This Court finds by unanimous
decision and by clear and
convincing evidence that Roy S.
Moore, in willfully and publicly
defying the valid Court order from
the federal court violated Canons
1, 2, 2A and 2B of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics as indicated in
the complaint of the Judicial
Inquiry Commission.
During the trial of this
matter, Chief Justice maintained
his defiance testifying that he
stood by an earlier statement
given to him -- given by him to
the Judicial Inquiry Commission in
which he stated in part, "I did
what I did because I upheld my
oath and that's what I did. So I
have no apologies for it. I would
do it again." The Chief Justice
showed no signs of contrition for
his actions.
Because of the magnitude of
the decision with regard to
sanctions for the Chief Justice's
violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics was a difficult
one for this Court to make.
Finding no other viable
alternatives, this Court hereby
orders that Roy S. Moore be
removed from his position of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of
Alabama.
This Court is now adjourned.
(The hearing concluded at
11:22 a.m.)
* * * * *
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
* * * * *
STATE OF ALABAMA
ELMORE COUNTY
I, Jeana S. Boggs, Certified Professional
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Alabama at Large, do hereby certify on Wednesday,
November 12th, 2003, that I reported in the matter
of CHIEF JUSTICE ROY MOORE, case No. 33, now pending
in the State of Alabama Court of the Judiciary; that
the foregoing colloquies, statements, questions and
answers thereto were reduced to 21 typewritten pages
under my direction and supervision; that the excerpt
transcript is a true and accurate transcription of
the testimony/evidence of the examination of said
hearing by counsel for the parties set out herein.
I further certify that I am neither of
relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of
the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of such
attorney or counsel, nor am I financially interested
in the results thereof. All rates charged are usual
and customary.
This the 12th day of November, 2003.
Jeana S. Boggs
Certified Court Reporter and
Notary Public
Commission expires: 8/14/2006
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